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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 3, Number 16 (November 4, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Health watch continues 
Whether President Yel'tsin is suffering from exhaustion, a cold, bronchitis, 
unstable blood pressure, dementia or all of the above is rapidly becoming less 
important an issue than his administration's inability to cope with his erratic 
schedule. The October trip to Vienna demonstrates the confusion and conflicts in 
the president's entourage. 
 
As officials from the foreign ministry hyped the significance of Yel'tsin's 
appearance at the European Union meeting in Vienna, dissonance was evident 
in comments on the president's physical preparedness for an international jaunt. 
While his doctors were said to be uniformly opposed to the trip, advisers 
Dyachenko and Yumashev "understood the importance" of Vienna and were 
preparing him for it. (Argumenty i fakty, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-294) The 
president's actions, following his premature return from Central Asia, suggest that 
he is making a determined effort to appear as robust as possible and was quite 
likely adamant about attending. 
 
Within a few days of Yel'tsin's scheduled departure, Press Secretary Yakushkin 
announced that the visit had been "tightened" (not reduced!) to require only a 
one-day stay. (Interfax, 0836 GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295) As has been 
widely reported, not only was the president's appearance canceled, but a 
"medical council" convened to discuss his health just prior to the trip 
recommended a vacation instead. (Interfax, 1315 GMT, 26 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-299) Yel'tsin has since departed for Sochi. 
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The cancellation of this visit (Primakov did attend in Yel'tsin's place) 
demonstrates the reappearance of a familiar, if unwelcome, pattern of Yel'tsin's 
presidency in the mixed signals sent from the Kremlin. Not only has the press 
secretary been left to contradict himself from day to day, but the ascendance of 
the government and prime minister (vis-a-vis the Kremlin) has blurred the role of 
presidential advisers to leave us once again wondering who has the president's 
ear and who, if anyone, can speak authoritatively on the president's behalf. 
 
The difference most notable in this recent brouhaha over the president's health is 
also its silver lining. While prior presidential hospitalizations and "vacations" have 
elicited calls for constitutional reform from the opposition, this time it appears 
even the Kremlin may realize that the extreme concentration of power in the 
presidency is paralyzing during periods of Yel'tsin's incapacitation. Deputy Chair 
of the President's Administration Oleg Sysuev announced plans for a gathering of 
experts and representatives of major political parties, during which "a strategy for 
constitutional reform will be drawn up." (NTV, 1 Nov 98; Agence France-Presse, 
1 Nov 98/nexis) Now if we could only confirm that Sysuev has the president's 
support.... 
 
Two media-related notes on coverage of the president's health 
-- Russian media outlets were informed of the cancellation of the President's 
Vienna trip by a foreign news agency (Reuters). A miffed NTV correspondent 
complained to Sysuev that many journalists had already departed for Vienna 
before receiving word of the cancellation and asked why Russian journalists had 
been notified after the foreign press. Sysuev claimed it was just a "mistake." 
(NTV, 1640 GMT, 26 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-299) 
-- Former Chief of Presidential Security Aleksandr Korzhakov was asked recently 
to comment on footage of the president stumbling in Uzbekistan, which was 
shown on Russian television despite being "unauthorized" footage. According to 
Korzhakov, in similar circumstances in the past, the Presidential Security Service 
under his direction would simply approach cameramen and ask for their tapes. 
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"Relations were quite civilized, and I do not recall these private requests not 
being fulfilled. Quarreling with the Security Service would be more trouble than it 
is worth." (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 24 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-299 
 
Yel'tsin again rejects running in 2000 
At a meeting with Prime Minister Primakov on 20 October, Yel'tsin adamantly 
denied any intention to stand again for president in the year 2000: "I will not run! 
No! No! And they have taken things so far that the Constitutional Court is 
reviewing the matter. Is it possible to run again or is it not possible. But I am not 
going to run. Why are you tormenting me?" (NTV, 1000 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-293) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Two new councils formed 
The justice ministry, headed by Pavel Krasheninnikov, has established a new 
consultative body comprised of former justice ministers from both the recent 
Russian and Soviet past. Members named to date include Sergei Stepashin, 
Vladimir Terebilov, Aleksandr Sukharev, Nikolai Fedorov, and Veniamin 
Yakovlev. The council is tasked with "fostering legal culture of the population," 
training junior judiciary staffers, and "raising the level of norm-setting and 
monitoring activities of the Justice Ministry." (ITAR-TASS, 0941 GMT, 16 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-289) 
 
Prime Minister Primakov has also created a new commission for international 
military and technical cooperation. First Vice Prime Minister Igor Maslyukov has 
been appointed to chair the commission. (ITAR-TASS, 1443 GMT, 26 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-299) It may be recalled that when Maslyukov first joined the 
government in July, he lobbied strenuously for an oversight role in arms sales, 
and with that history in mind the actual functions of this commission may bear 
watching. 
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FSB 
Nikitin gets reprieve but not acquittal 
In a decision handed down on Friday, 30 October, St. Petersburg Judge Sergei 
Golets criticized the espionage indictment brought against Aleksander Nikitin as 
too vague, and instructed the FSB to re-investigate and re-file the charges. 
Speculation as to why the judge did not simply acquit Nikitin focuses on the legal 
requirements for the judge to present a detailed, coherent rebuttal of charges in 
order to acquit. With vaguely conceived indictments, the rebuttal becomes more 
difficult to compose. (Moscow Times, 31 Oct 98; nexis) 
 
Nikitin, pending appeal to the Supreme Court, is still required to abide by bail 
guidelines restricting his travel beyond St. Petersburg. And as Diederik Lohman 
from the Human Rights Watch cautions, "It is not an acquittal. (...) He could still 
go to jail." (Moscow Times, 31 Oct 98; nexis) (For details on this prosecution, see 
Diederik Lohman "The Nikitin Case: Rule of Law?" Perspective, vol. VII, no.2, 
November-December 98.) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
United States no obstacle to Russian-Iranian relationship 
A recent wave of editorials in Iranian newspapers, broadcasts from official Iranian 
radio as well as statements from Iran's ambassador in Moscow have all been 
aimed at reassuring the world, if not Moscow, that Iranian-Russian cooperation is 
alive and well. Immediately following the 21 October (nearly unanimous) vote in 
the Russian Duma to expand ties with Iran, the Iranian propaganda machine 
churned out a list of benefits the partners as well as the region have already 
reaped from the growing bilateral relationship.  
 
 5 
Claiming that US "interventionist" policies could not damage Iran's ties with 
Russia, Iranian editorials trumpeted the 21 October Duma vote as a victory for 
Iran over the US and American influence in the region. Iranian Ambassador to 
Russia Mehdi Safari voiced these same thoughts in an interview with a Moscow 
paper. In the Moscow dailyTrud, the ambassador said that, given the fact that the 
two countries share some common national interests, it is impossible for a third 
party to affect the current trend of bilateral relations. The two neighboring 
countries enjoy common views regarding regional issues, he added, and they 
can promote their bonds independently and free from interference of any 
outsider. 
 
Although there was no official statement from Primakov's government following 
the Duma resolution, an English-language newspaper in Tehran cited Yevgeni 
Primakov as the primary architect of the "new" Russian-Iranian partnership, 
explaining that "when Primakov was the Russian foreign minister, Iran and 
Russia developed ties to a great extent." The same editorial looked at even 
stronger ties between the two countries with optimism based on the fact that 
Primakov is now heading the government in Moscow and "in view of his 
(Primakov's) anti-Western views." (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1100 
GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-NES-98-295, Iran News, 18 Oct 98, p. 2; FBIS-NES-98-
301, and IRNA, 1655 GMT, 21 Oct 98; FBIS-NES-98-295) 
 
Russia denies delivering missile components to Iraq but... 
Responding to a Washington Post article published on 18 October, Russian 
foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin stated that Russia strictly 
observes the UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq and has not delivered 
missile homing systems to that country. Rakhmanin said that "no deliveries along 
government channels were in question," referring to 800 sophisticated 
gyroscopes that were bought at a missile dismantling facility near Moscow in 
November 1995 and seized by Jordanian authorities in Amman. "The question is 
closed," he said. "The official explanations to this end given by the Russian side 
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were accepted by the U.N. Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq and 
there have been no additional inquiries from it," Rakhmanin said. (Interfax, 0839 
GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-TAC-98-295) 
 
...Zhirinovsky delivers humanitarian aid 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and 
Russian lower house deputy speaker Mikhail Gutseriev planned to deliver a 
shipment of humanitarian aid to Iraq on 31 October. Zhirinovsky and Gutseriev, 
also an LDPR member, were invited to the Arab country by President Saddam 
Hussein, the deputy speaker's press service said on 29 October. The two visitors 
are scheduled to meet with National Council Chairman Saadun Hamadi and 
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz to discuss "issues related to the need for lifting 
U.N. sanctions against Iraq and development prospects for Russian-Iraqi 
cooperation," the press service told Interfax. (Interfax, 1455 GMT, 29 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-302) Although the press release did indicate the two would be 
delivering medicine and school stationary, it did not mention where the supplies 
came from in light of the extreme economic hardships in Russia today. 
 
Russians lobby Congress on nuclear export control 
A delegation which included representatives from the State Duma (lower house), 
the Russian Security Council, the foreign ministry, and the Russian defense 
ministry recently met with US officials in Washington to discuss export controls. 
Russian "experts," headed by Anatoli Bulochkin, head of the Russian Export 
Control Center, held meetings at the US National Security Council as well as at 
the US Departments of State and Commerce. According to Bulochkin, the 
Russian and US representatives signed a big package of documents on export 
control in Moscow in September and the October trip was designed to work out 
some of "its nuances." But Bulochkin did not conceal the fact that the main task 
of the group was to undermine Congressional support for US sanctions against 
Russian companies suspected of delivering missile components and technology 
to Iran. Bulochkin emphasized that "we want to show Congressmen, especially 
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those who express especially vociferously their concern over this question, that 
export control operates in Russia and that they should not fear Russian-Iranian 
relations." (ITAR-TASS, 0150 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-293) 
 
Finno-Ugric aid, cover for covert operations 
In order to better "control" some of Russia's ethnic minorities, Russian ethnic 
affairs minister Ramazan Abdulatipov wants to regulate closely humanitarian aid 
destined for some of the country's ethnic minorities. The ethnic affairs minister 
looks suspiciously at Finnish, Hungarian and Estonian aid to people of Finno-
Ugric background in Russia and claims those countries may introduce their spies 
into Russia under the pretext of bringing humanitarian aid. Abdulatipov said that 
there may be people among those bringing humanitarian aid who try to instigate 
anti-Russian sentiments among the small peoples of Russia. The Russian 
minister told reporters on 23 October, "instead of unilateral humanitarian aid 
Russia should introduce bilateral relations in order to better control Estonia's, 
Hungary's and Finland's relations with the Mari, Mordvin, Karelians, Komi, 
Khanty, Mansi and other Finno-Ugric peoples." Abdulatipov also said that Russia 
should take a more careful attitude to young men and women from small Finno-
Ugric peoples to whom Estonia, Finland and Hungary offer opportunities of 
studying at their higher educational institutions, stating that, "if we let things take 
their own course, it is not clear what orientation the young people may have 
when returning from those higher schools."(BNS, 1510 GMT, 23 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-296)  
 
Peace treaty-1, territorial issue-0 
Territorial concessions weren't on the menu at the delegation's closing dinner, 
but Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura still left Moscow feeling "very 
satisfied." Until recently, the Japanese linked the Kurile Island territorial issue to 
the negotiation of a peace treaty with Russia. At the most recent meeting in 
Moscow, Foreign Minister Ivanov stated that "Japan [did] not put any pressure on 
Russia in the territorial dispute and during the work on a peace treaty." (ITAR-
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TASS, 2040 GMT, 17 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-290) Instead, Japan has focused on 
developing the economic aspects of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations, as well 
as common views on international crises and problems such as Kosovo and the 
Korean peninsula. 
 
To that end, Ivanov promised to draft a "Moscow Declaration" which will reaffirm 
that the two countries will pursue a peace treaty by 2000. (Kyodo, 0815 GMT, 25 
Oct 98; FBIS-EAS-98-29) This merely reconfirmed earlier verbal agreements 
between Yel'tsin and former Prime Minister Hashimoto. The declaration is the 
first written statement since the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, in which Russia and 
Japan pledged to settle the territorial dispute. The peace treaty settlement has 
made considerable progress, in spite of this earlier declaration: In June, the 
Russian government handed over its version of the treaty that excluded the 
territorial article. It was discussion of this draft that so "satisfied" Komura earlier 
this month, and it is this draft which was under discussion by deputy ministers 
during the 29-30 October meeting in Tokyo. 
 
The Duma has applauded efforts to conclude a peace treaty but has been 
vehemently opposed to any territorial concessions. Duma Foreign Affairs 
Committee chair Vladimir Lukin responded to the delegation's efforts, saying, 
"the prospects for Russia and Japan signing a peace treaty [are] real...[but] of 
course, Russia will not cede the Southern Kuriles." (ITAR-TASS, 1831 GMT, 23 
Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-296) On this issue, there appears to be no negotiation. 
Any concession made by the government would most likely not receive the Duma 
support. (ITAR-TASS, 1028 GMT, 26 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-289) 
 
China and Russia say 'no' on NATO 
It is clear that certain subjects will need no discussion at the Sino-Russian 
summit on 23 November. Not only are Russia and China "'categorically against' 
NATO's eastward expansion," but they also support a settlement in Kosovo "only 
by peaceful, diplomatic means." (ITAR-TASS, 0438 GMT, 24 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-
 9 
98-297, and ITAR-TASS, 1305 GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295) What is left 
for discussion at the summit is "strategic partnership...based on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence characterized by non-alignment, non-
confrontation and not targeted at a third country." (Xinhua, 1050 GMT, 22 Oct 98; 
FBIS-CHI-98-295) These remarks come at a time when China and Russia are 
pursuing a military partnership that will arm China with advanced weaponry and 
technology. The Russian government has pledged to take a "more serious 
approach" to Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation, but noted that 
insufficient financing may delay some of the efforts proposed in the economic 
and nuclear sector. Arms transfers appear to be moving along. (ITAR-TASS, 
1102 GMT, 27 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-300) 
 
Six-way talks: to be or not to be? 
As the third round of four-way talks came to an end in Geneva early in October, 
the issue of expanding the talks to a multi-state forum continued to be debated. 
The proposal, which is supported by the ROK, Japan, and Russia, would expand 
the current four-way talks involving the US, China, ROK, and DPRK to include 
Japan and Russia. While the latter two nations and the ROK support the idea, 
the US has disagreed, saying that it would be too difficult to persuade the DPRK 
to participate in six-way talks. Instead, US Ambassador to South Korea Stephen 
Bosworth suggested that the six-way talks concern Northeast Asian security in 
general, while the four-way talks would continue to concern security on the 
Korean peninsula. (Yonhap, 0233 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-EAS-98-292) Russia 
has expressed interest in any talks concerning security on the peninsula or in the 
region. (ITAR-TASS, 1324 GMT, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
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MEDIA 
Mass media supervisory council off to a rocky start 
The idea of supervisory councils for television is not a new one. In 1993, former 
television executive and Working Russia leader Viktor Anpilov demanded that 
councils be set up to purge the electronic media of American and Israeli 
influence. In autumn 1997, under pressure from the State Duma, the president 
and the government gave the go-ahead to set up supervisory bodies at Russian 
Public TV (ORT) and All-Russian State Television and Radio Company 
(VGTRK). The ORT Council has only met once so far, in May 1998. 
 
In the wake of Boris Yel'tsin's dismissal of the Kirienko government, the Duma 
gave the go-ahead to set up a supervisory council at the second TV channel -- 
VGTRK. The Supervisory Council held its first session and is composed of seven 
persons representing the president's administration, the government, the State 
Duma, and the Federation Council. Also invited were representatives of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the Olympic 
Committee, the Judicial Chamber, and cultural and press figures. If the first 
meeting is any indication of the council's value as a filtering agent for non-
Russian influences, however, not much influence should be detected. Only two 
representatives from the Duma were present, no one from the Federation 
Council showed up, and the proposal to elect Deputy Prime Minister Valentina 
Matvienko as chair of the supervisory council came to naught because she too 
was absent. 
 
Regardless of the problems surrounding its first meeting, media supervisory 
councils are potentially very dangerous and hark back to the days of press 
censorship and thought control. But even so, the fractured nature of Russian 
politics and society may mean that censorship, no matter how patriotic the cause, 
may be very difficult. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 16 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-289) 
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Media leaders sign petition opposing new law 
An appeal to the Duma opposing the new draft media law has been signed by 
the chief editors of over 30 media outlets including ORT, VGTRK, NTV, TV6, 
ITAR-TASS, Interfax, and RIA-novosti, the newspapers Trud, Kommersant Daily, 
Nezavisimaya, Izvestiya, and Segodnya, the magazines Itogi and Ogonek, and 
the radio stations Radio Russia and Ekho Moskvy. The appeal claims that 
implementation of the proposed law would have deleterious effects on Russian 
freedom of speech. If the law is adopted, supervisory councils will appear in the 
editorial offices and these will be, in essence, censoring boards. Moreover, under 
the pretext of combating monopolies, the authors of the draft law propose 
restricting the broadcasting of television channels and radio stations to one 
constituent part of the federation which, the media chiefs say, will lead to the 
closure of nationwide television and radio companies. Overall, the adoption of 
such a law will mean an increase in the control exercised by state bodies over 
the state media and possibly arbitrary control by bureaucrats over the private 
media. 
 
The communists, Agrarians, and fellow travelers are sensing that the time is ripe 
to limit the power of private media outlets whose opinion is invariably at odds with 
their own. And by establishing monitoring councils, supporters of the law must 
believe that they could limit the power of the "oligarchs" who own and run the 
large, private media outlets. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 1200 GMT, 16 Oct 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-289) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon and Fred Drummond 
 
Finders keepers, losers weepers? 
Last month, a train originating in Iran and bound for Afghanistan was stopped 
and impounded by Kyrgyzstan customs officials. The 20-car train was marked as 
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"humanitarian aid." Apparently, the "aid" came in the form of military weapons 
and equipment -- Russian-made. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. 3, No. 15, 21 
October 98.) The Kyrgyz government was clearly embarrassed by the 
confiscation. The Kyrgyz parliament held a special session and voted to return 
the nearly 700-ton consignment of Russian arms and ammunition to Iran, most 
probably bowing deeply to pressure from both Iran and Russia. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 21 Oct 98) However, not all in the Kyrgyz government are beating to 
the same drum. The Kyrgyzstan State Customs Committee (whose director was 
suspended from his post shortly after the incident) has other ideas: refusing the 
government order to release the train and insisting on confiscating the cargo. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 27 Oct 98) Additionally, Tursunbai Bakirov, 
leader of the opposition Erkin Kyrgyzstan party, has stated that returning the 
arms to Iran would set a dangerous precedent and his party favors giving the 
weapons to the Kyrgyz forces. (RFE/RL, 21 Oct 98; Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 21 Oct 98) Some people just don't get the word! There is a solution that 
could make everyone happy: The Kyrgyz could return the 18-car train back to 
Iran (the Iranian ambassador said that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have both 
agreed to let the train pass through their countries). Then, leaving no stone 
unturned, Kyrgyz customs officials could redeem themselves by locating the two 
(at this point "unaccounted for") 300+ ton rail cars still missing somewhere in 
Kyrgyzstan. (RFE/RL Newsline, 21 Oct 98) The "humanitarian aid" remaining in 
these cars could then be used to "feed" their military forces. 
 
Topol-M topples em-phatically on fifth test 
Even before First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov took over his new post 
this fall, Russian Federation officials had been quoting (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 17 Sep 98) high production figures on the order of 30 per year starting in 
2000 for their much-touted Topol-M missile (designated SS-27 by NATO). Almost 
immediately upon assuming the post of the government's economic czar, 
Maslyukov became very vocal about the need to upgrade Russia's strategic 
nuclear armaments. He has called for construction of 35-45 new Topol-M 
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missiles every year starting in 2000. (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Oct 98) (Note: On 16 
October, Jamestown Foundation Prism quoted Maslyukov as saying the 35-45 
annual missile production rate would commence in the year 2002.) 
 
From all reports, it appears true that the Topol-M is a formidable missile. It is a 
solid-fuel propelled, three-stage missile which carries a single nuclear warhead 
and is to be deployed both in silos and mobile launchers. A variant of the Topol-
M (about 70 percent compatible with the land-based version) is also to be used in 
Russia's new generation of ballistic-missile submarines, with at least one 
currently under construction. Top Russian military officials have repeatedly 
referred to the missile as a "weapon of the 21st century" and make no secret of 
their belief in its supposed ability to evade American antiballistic missile systems. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 26 Oct 98) If all the impressive capabilities 
above prove true, then the Topol-M may indeed be as Monitor describes -- the 
jewel in Russia's strategic nuclear crown. 
 
However, that jewel is looking more like cubic zirconia these days. The Topol-M 
program suffered another serious setback in mid-October 1998 when, during the 
fifth test flight of the new missile, it exploded shortly after takeoff from the 
Plesetsk test range. Vaulting ahead at the blazing speed of an amoeba, this was 
only the first test in 1998 and fifth overall. Previous schedules expected a full 
regiment to be operational by the end of this year, but alas only the token two at 
Tatischevo remain poised and positioned. Topol-M problems have also touched 
the triad's seaborne leg. Though production of the new generation ballistic-
missile submarine, Yuri Dologoruk, was started two years ago, work has had to 
be suspended due to repeated missile test failures. (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 26 Oct 98) 
 
Okay, let's assume for a split second that the technological hurdles (which are 
looking more like the Great Wall right now) can be overcome shortly. An even 
higher hurdle facing the ambitious production rate is one of economics. Without 
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expounding on the details, suffice it to say that Russia's economy is far from 
booming and has every indication of getting worse. Experts estimate that the cost 
of manufacturing a single Topol-M is between $35 million and $40 million. (Now 
you can understand the reference to a crown jewel.) Therefore, with a little quick 
math -- if 35-45 missiles are produced annually at a cost of $40 million apiece, 
the annual cost for missiles alone would be between $1.2 billion - $1.8 billion. 
Definitely a sizable portion of the overall defense budget, this outlay would most 
assuredly comprise almost the entire budget for new systems acquisition over 
the next decade to decade and a half. During a visit to the Topol-M producing 
Votkin missile plant in Udmurtia (northeast Russia) on 20 October, Maslyukov 
said the government should provide the necessary financing for the project. 
(Interfax, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-283) Let's see, I'm sure they could take it from 
the pay account, or may just print up an extra 40 billion rubles or so. The already 
struggling Russian defense industry simply cannot weather this almost complete 
stoppage in production -- and certainly not for a 10-15 year period. On 13 
October, Kommersant vlast argued Maslyukov's plan "would spell doom" to the 
rest of the military complex. 
 
A program like the Topol-M, which spends a disproportionally high percentage of 
the budget, would be risky even if all other aspects of the military were healthy. 
However, considering the state of the Russian Federation's military today [air 
force pilots receiving less than 1/3 of the required flight time, ground troops with 
70 percent of their equipment already outdated (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 Oct 98), 
naval ships rusting in the harbors], this investment strategy makes gold 
speculating look like a savings account. In addition to spelling doom for the 
military complex, you can add c-a-t-a-s-t-r-o-p-h-e to your spelling of military 
readiness. 
 
Finally, when all logic and sound planning fails to make sense, one may look 
toward the political arena to determine if the current global environment provides 
valid reasoning. Russia is courting the West for substantial financial assistance. 
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An agreement appears imminent on antiballistic missile system levels between 
the US and Russia. The bipolar world of the past half-century has been replaced 
with a more multi-polar sphere, where regional, conventional conflicts are the 
norm. Okay, I tried. It still doesn't make sense. 
 
There are few who believe that the Russians can actually follow through with 
their ambitious Topol-M production goals and even fewer who actually 
understand why they are even trying, but one thing seems clear. Above all else 
and at whatever cost, Russia feels compelled to modernize her strategic nuclear 
force. If this is the only aspect of the military which receives attention in the near- 
and mid-term, then it will be their only viable capability in the same period. 
Therefore, if threatened, using the same logic applicable to a cornered animal, 
what would be their only recourse? 
 
Partial victory for Nikitin 
Retired Navy Captain Aleksandr Nikitin won, in the words of his supporters, a 
"partial victory" in his trial on charges of espionage and treason. (St. Petersburg 
Times, 30 Oct 98; see also Editorial Digest, 7 Oct 98) Nikitin's charges stemmed 
from his reporting for the Bellona Foundation, a Norwegian enviromental 
organization, on Russian Navy nuclear contamination. The St. Petersburg Times 
stated that the judge sent the case back to the prosecutors as the charges were 
too vague to allow continuance. This means that the case has not been 
dismissed, but that rather the government must try again to come up with specific 
charges against Nikitin. The article mentioned that the government had been told 
on at least two previous occasions that its case was too vague. A human rights 
activist monitoring the trial was quoted as saying that, under current Russian law, 
this was as close as the judge could get to dismissing the case altogether. The 
case could drag on for another year or more. Nikitin's lawyers are now fighting to 
remove travel restrictions on their client. 
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Nikitin's team was apparently heartened shortly after the trial began on 20 
October. The St. Petersburg Times reported that the defense lawyers finally saw 
the secret decrees against their client after a wait of more than two years. The 
lawyers characterized the decrees as guidelines which did not list what 
constituted state secrets. This strengthened the defense team's claim that there 
was in fact no case against Nikitin from the start. Although the judge closed the 
trial to the public after the initial sessions, at least one defense lawyer was 
pleased with the judge's efforts to understand the case on its own merits. So, 
perhaps there is some hope for the Russian judicial system after all. Stay tuned. 
 
Pasko trial starts and stops 
The Nikitin trial is not the only court case concerning a Russian naval officer and 
the press. Komsomol'skaya pravda reported that Captain Second Rank Grigori 
Pasko is awaiting trial in a Pacific Fleet military court on charges of treason "in 
the form of espionage" for information gathered for Japanese media. Pasko has 
been charged with passing a secret document to a foreign organization, a 
document that one of Pasko's lawyers asserts was given to Pasko by a "high 
ranking Pacific Fleet Headquarters officer." Pasko has been detained for almost 
a year under questionable legal justification as the details of the initial 
investigation have not been made public. Shades of Nikitin, although in this 
instance there is no charge that "laws" were made up and applied after the fact. 
The article's tone is interesting -- the concluding paragraph makes a pointed 
comment on the career benefits of being a criminal investigator presiding over 
"betrayal[s] of the motherland." Apparently being a senior prosecutor helps 
ensure upward mobility. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-288) 
 
ITAR-TASS also reported on this case, noting that a one-month (or longer) 
postponement is taking place due to the defense lawyers challenging the legality 
of the proceedings. (ITAR-TASS, 0946 GMT, 15 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-288) The 
differences between Komsomol'skaya pravda and Tass in ideological slant are 
readily apparent when reading the articles back to back. The former takes what 
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might best be described as a questioning or even aggressive stance against the 
government's position. Tass appears outwardly neutral in its reporting, but 
obviously is repeating the government's bland pronouncements, as befits the 
mouthpiece of the power structure. This case too bears watching as an indication 
of where Russia's judicial system is heading -- towards legitimacy or back to the 
past. 
 
Sea Breeze '98: Sailing together on the Black Sea 
Despite harsh rhetoric from Russia recently over possible US and NATO strikes 
with respect to the situation in Kosovo, Russian military forces participated in the 
NATO sponsored Sea Breeze '98 exercise. Held in Ukraine and off the Russian 
Black Sea coast, the US and five other NATO countries, along with five non-
NATO Black Sea countries, participated in the second running of this event. The 
Jamestown Foundation's Monitor reports that "4,500 sailors and soldiers, 
including 1,500 Ukrainians" participated in the exercise that took place from 26 
October until 2 November. The exercise "rehearses a UN-authorized, NATO-led 
response to a devastating earthquake superimposed on a political crisis...." The 
Russians were invited to last year's outing but refused to participate. Learning the 
lessons from last year, this primarily US-funded exercise was reworked in order 
to defuse Russia's objections and allow its participation. (Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 27 Oct 98) 
 
Interfax filled in some other details in a press release posted prior to the start of 
the exercise. Ships from 11 navies were scheduled to participate in the four-day 
sea phase. The coastal phase was to include offensive and defensive military 
actions with concurrent humanitarian aid efforts. Left-wing members of Ukraine's 
parliament tried to outlaw the exercise but failed to obtain the necessary votes to 
do so. (Interfax, 1356 GMT, 25 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-298) NTV broadcast a 
report as the exercise was wrapping up, and talked of "side by side, lads from 
Kaluga and Nebraska repelling terrorist attacks, taking out the wounded, and 
freeing the ambassador of an unknown country." The reporter noted the irony 
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that the catalyst for the humanitarian scenario was a devastating earthquake 
when in fact five days before the exercise's start, seismic activity was noted that 
may indeed portend a real earthquake. (NTV, 0900 GMT, 1 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-306) 
 
America's presence in the Black Sea is definitely expanding. Sea Breeze '98 
follows closely on the heels of a US Navy port visit to Georgia in September, a 
trip also notable for the staff and infrastructure assistance given by the US to the 
Georgian navy. Despite Russia's uneasiness over US encroachment into its 
formerly exclusive domain, the Russians obviously felt it was better to participate 
in this year's exercise than to opt out as in last year's case. Russia probably 
realizes that, in order to maintain some relevance and possible influence in the 
region, it cannot afford to sit at home and sulk. 
 
Have a forest fire? Have we got a plane for you 
Russian television recently reported on the Be200, a new amphibious aircraft 
designed to "put out fires and rescue people in emergencies." (NTV, 0800 GMT, 
18 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-291) Also, and more accurately, described in the 
feature as a multi-purpose aircraft, the Beriev Be200 is a development of the A-
40 Albatross, first seen in 1989. (To confuse the name issue a little further, the A-
40 is also known as the Be42 by Beriev. Its NATO reporting name is Mermaid.) 
 
The debut of the Albatross in the late 1980s took the aviation world by surprise; 
amphibious aircraft were considered to be passe, and, unlike most previous 
amphibians, it was jet-powered. One primary question at the time was: What is 
the market for the plane? The obvious answer was the Soviet navy, but the 
collapse of the USSR pretty much ensured that the A-40 was not going into mass 
production. Beriev has been talking about civil variants since the introduction of 
the A-40; the TV report does indeed mention that development of the Be200 
began eight years ago. 
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The NTV correspondent stated that South Korea and China, among others, "are 
planning to buy these aircraft." Maybe. What is for certain is that Beriev has 
joined the other Russian aircraft design bureaus in promoting the sale of their 
hardware outside the Russian borders, because sales prospects within Russia or 
the are slim at best. 
 
Buk-M1-2 update 
We reported on the Buk-M1-2 (NATO reporting name SA-11) surface-to-air 
missile system in the last Editorial Digest (21 October 98). ITAR-TASS tells us 
that Belarus will be the first customer for this upgraded system. (ITAR-TASS, 
0750 GMT, 19 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-292) In typical Tass prose, the news 
release states that "Russia is motivated for technical assistance to Byelorussia 
which efficiently guards the western rim of the CIS...." Perhaps fearing an 
imminent NATO invasion, Belarus "asked" for "modernization" of its air defense 
system because of possible NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia. It is not 
surprising that Belarus would be the first recipient of the Buk-M1 upgrade -- of all 
the former republics of the USSR, Belarus seems to miss being part of the old 
Soviet Union the most. Nowhere though does the press report address that all 
important question these days concerning anything Russian -- who is paying for 
the upgrade. At any rate, Belarusians and Russians can sleep easier once this 
system is deployed. 
 
More on the ubiquitous Grad 
Also in the 21 October Editorial Digest, we mentioned an upgrade for the Grad 
surface-to-surface rocket system, and an upcoming live-fire demonstration of the 
system to a host of visiting foreign military officers. The demonstration took place 
as advertised in mid-October. Both ITAR-TASS and NTV reported on the event. 
Essentially the Russians developed an improved rocket with greater range and at 
least the same accuracy as the original rockets for the Grad system. The ITAR-
TASS report focused not so much on the Grad itself as it did on a French 
company that is accused of bad faith and broken agreements. The French firm 
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Selerg had been working with the Splav research and production company, 
makers of the Grad, on advanced rocket designs. The French firm is charged 
with using jointly gathered data for its own purposes and not fulfilling its 
marketing deals with Splav. (ITAR-TASS, 1451 GMT, 15 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
288) We're waiting for the French version of events, but, in the meantime, it might 
be prudent to be wary of all joint adventures with Russian arms firms. 
 
The NTV report was a bit more interesting, but we wonder if there is a required, 
standardized Russian journalist news report checklist regarding new and 
improved weapons systems. Specifically, the Grad, as with all recent Russian 
systems, is described as "totally one of a kind." That's the same language used 
for the Buk-M1-2, the Be200, the S-300, well, you get the idea. Much was made 
of the "secret" Orenburg training range, where the news reporters were not even 
allowed to take the covers off their cameras until just before the firing 
demonstration began. [Interestingly, this area seems to be the same area that a 
NATO mission, comprised mainly of Americans, visited on 18 October. The 
mission was inspecting the area for the upcoming Peacekeeper '99 exercise, a 
NATO Partnership for Peace program. (Interfax, 0719 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-293)] 
 
Although only the Grad was supposed to on the program, another rocket system, 
the Smerch, just happened to launch a "couple of rockets sort of by accident. 
This was probably soldier's cunning" on behalf of the government's arms sales 
agency, Rosvooruzhenie. Just hope those same folks aren't trying to sell any 
spare nuclear weapons. Initiative is fine, but . . . . At any rate, the TV report 
ended on a candid note: The new rocket system is expected only to generate 
foreign sales, as the Russian military does not have the money to buy it. (NTV, 
1500 GMT, 16 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-289) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
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By Sarah Miller 
 
Boris the conqueror 
At a meeting of the CIS Working Group charged with developing plans for CIS 
reforms, Boris Berezovsky, CIS executive secretary, lamented the inability of the 
group to offer any viable reorganization plans. However, this did not prevent him 
from suggesting Yugoslavia's inclusion in the commonwealth. (Interfax, 1502 
GMT, 21 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-294) Berezovsky has also suggested the CIS 
might expand to include Iran. 
 
Economically, the CIS is fostering trade ties with several non-member states. 
Recent CIS trade delegations have expanded the trade dialogue with Turkey and 
Egypt. Turkish President Suleiman Demirel stressed that "Turkey cannot behave 
timidly in her relations with Russia," saying that he believes Russia will overcome 
the present economic difficulties soon. (Anatolia, 1011 GMT, 28 Oct 98; FBIS-
WEU-98-301) Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa recently pronounced the 
world's "rediscover[y] of the Asian Commonwealth, a region of major strategic 
and economic importance." (MENA, 1109 GMT, 21 Oct 98; FBIS-NES-98-294) 
 
CIS peacekeeping in Tajikistan will continue, despite a reduction in administrative 
staff, the commander of the CIS peacekeeping forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai 
Pugachev, said at a recent press conference. (Radio Tajikistan, 0800 GMT, 13 
Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-287) However, Russian Federal Border Guard Service 
Colonel General Konstantin Totsky explained that CIS member states will be 
forced to absorb more of the costs of protecting their borders, since the situation 
in all border areas of Russia (has) seriously deteriorated in the recent period. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1406 GMT, 23 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-296) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
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UKRAINE 
Curtain up! Light the lights! 
The political play leading up to next year's presidential election has begun in 
Ukraine, and it's not a pretty spectacle. During the last two weeks, over one 
dozen parties, factions of parties, and would-be parties have released lists of 
their possible presidential candidates. Unfortunately for President Leonid 
Kuchma, his name doesn't appear on many of those lists. The resulting political 
posturing has turned the parliament into little more than a public relations tool for 
these parties, while Ukraine is in the middle of the most difficult economic crisis 
the country has ever experienced. 
 
As expected, Ukraine's leftist parties continue to use the crisis to attempt to 
increase their influence. On 20 October, two weeks after failing to win a "no-
confidence" vote against the government of Prime Minister Valeriy 
Pustovoytenko, 122 Communist Party MPs walked out of parliament. They did 
so, they said, to protest the government's failure to produce a budget on time. 
The Communist deputies were supported by 68 other leftist deputies. President 
Kuchma called the walkout "a war" against the Ukrainian people. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 21 Oct 1998) The final budget draft from the Cabinet of Ministers was 
due on 15 October, and was submitted on 23 October. Parliament has taken no 
action on the draft. 
 
The Communists also tried, but failed, to stop the NATO-funded Sea Breeze '98 
naval exercises which took place last week under the auspices of the Partnership 
for Peace program. (Interfax, 1356 GMT, 25 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-298) 
 
At the same time, the head of the ultra-leftist Hromada party, Pavlo Lazarenko, 
lashed out at the current administration, accusing unnamed individuals of 
attempts to assassinate him. (Kievskie vedomosti, 21 Oct 98; p. 7; FBIS-SOV-98-
301) Lazarenko, the former prime minister and a likely presidential candidate, is 
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now under investigation by the government for corrupt activities while in office. 
Hromada joined the Communists in supporting the "no-confidence" vote against 
Prime Minister Pustovoytenko, who is, by the way, widely suspected to also be a 
presidential candidate. 
 
In addition, President Kuchma's circle of allies seems to be shifting (and 
dwindling). In response to Kuchma's attempts to build a coalition involving 
influential Parliament Chairman (and probable presidential candidate) Oleksandr 
Tkachenko, Kuchma has apparently lost the support of several former allies -- 
most importantly, the nationalist Rukh Party. (Intelnews, 2326 GMT, 19 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-293, and Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 27 Oct 1998) Rukh 
opposes Tkachenko's endorsement of a "Slavic Union" involving Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine. The party, however, cannot match Tkachenko's power and 
influence in the council, something Kuchma desperately needs if he has any 
hope of passing his IMF-approved budget through parliament. 
 
Rukh, with 14 other "national-democratic" and centrist parties, appears ready to 
endorse Viktor Yushchenko, the head of the National Bank, in the presidential 
election. Curiously, Yushchenko was recently chastised by Kuchma for his 
monetary policies. (Intelnews, 0016 GMT, 23 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-296)  
 
For his part, Kuchma has attempted to go on the offensive. In several speeches 
he has strenuously criticized the parliament as a whole, saying, "Some of the 
deputies belong not in parliament, but behind bars." In one speech, he said that 
he planned to call for a public referendum on his new proposal to abolish 
immunity and privileges for deputies. Not long after that statement, he took 
control of the Security Service of Ukraine. The "decree" in which Kuchma 
announced the takeover also authorized the Security Service to "investigate 
cases when state officials are accused of impeding the employees of the Security 
Service in the fulfillment of their duties." (Intelnews, 0144 GMT, 29 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-302, and Interfax, 0144 GMT, 29 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-302) 
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Earlier, in the Kiev Courier newspaper, Pustovoytenko and Yushchenko together 
appealed for cooperation from the parliament. They wrote, "... substituting 
legislative work with calls to change the constitutional order ... is a display of 
political irresponsibility and anarchy." (Uryadovyy Kuryer, 26 Sep 98, p. 2; FBIS-
SOV-98-296) The audience members watching this remarkable display couldn't 
have said it better themselves. And the election is still a year away. 
 
BELARUS 
Welcome back! (maybe) 
The Belarusian foreign minister has told reporters that all ambassadors who left 
the Drozdy Diplomatic Compound may come back ... except the American, 
French and German ambassadors. Their residences, you see, have been 
"absorbed" into President Lukashenka's property. The foreign minister suggested 
that these three diplomats will "be given options." (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 Oct 98.) 
 
There has been no word on the status of the compound. Will it be considered 
part of President Lukashenka's property, as he once suggested? Or will it be a 
"diplomatic" area as required in the Vienna Convention? There is also no word 
on whether the countries in question have been officially contacted by the 
Belarusian government. So far, the only government to acknowledge receiving 
an invitation to return is Turkey, which is, incidentally, the one country that did not 
ban visits by senior Belarusian officials. (Interfax, 1004 GMT, 27 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-300, and RFE/FL Newsline, 23 Oct 98). 
 
Standing up for human rights 
Vera Stremkouskaya, a Belarusian lawyer and prominent human rights activist, 
has had her "activity" placed "under special control," following a briefing she gave 
to the International League for Human Rights in New York. Apparently, 
Stremkouskaya's view of human rights issues in Belarus is, according to the 
Belarusian justice ministry, "distorted." She 
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has been reprimanded, threatened with the loss of her license to practice law, 
and ordered to "be correct while giving interviews." Her activities will be 
monitored. (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Oct 1998, and RFE/RL Newsline, 16 Oct 98) 
But, of course, there's no problem with human rights in Belarus. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Will you go if we say 'please'? 
Three weeks ago, Moldova suddenly and inexplicably announced that the 
country would pull one platoon of peacekeepers (82 men) out of the Dniestr area. 
The troop removal would be the first following the 20 March 1998 Odessa 
agreement, in which both Moldova and Transdniestr agreed to reduce their 
peacekeeping troops by 200 men each. (Infotag, 1930 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-285) At that time, Moldovan officials "expressed hope" that Dniestr 
would, out of "good will," also reduce the number of its peacekeepers in the 
region. Dniestr officials simply ignored the Moldovan request. (See ISCIP 
Editorial Digest for 19 October 1998 for background.) 
 
Now, Moldovan officials "express hope" that Russia will remove its troops from 
Dniestr. On 21 October, officials proclaimed, "Moldova urges Russia to speed up 
the implementation of the 21 October 1994 agreement on the legal status, 
procedure and deadline for the withdrawal of Russian troops temporarily 
stationed in the territory of Moldova's Dniestr region." (ITAR-TASS, 1126 GMT, 
21 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-294) This hope is, indeed, optimistic. Despite requests, 
Russia has adamantly refused to remove its troops from other former republics, 
such as Georgia and Tajikistan. 
 
The Moldovan request cites a 1994 accord in which Russia agreed to a complete 
pullout of the former-Soviet 14th Army from Dniestr. At the time of its signing, the 
accord was vigorously attacked by Dniestr leaders, while Moldova announced 
that it now had the upper-hand in the struggle. There are only two problems with 
Moldova's request: The agreement was never ratified by the Russian Duma as 
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required, and the agreement specifically calls for a "synchronization of Russian 
troops' withdrawal with concrete measures of granting Dniestr a special juridical 
status." In other words, no settlement of the conflict means no Russian troop 
pullout. Coincidentally, there reportedly has been no progress in talks to settle 
the status of Dniestr. (See Basapress, 1930 GMT, 24 Oct 94; FBIS-SOV-94-208, 
for background on the agreement.) 
 
Bulgars to Moldova: How would you like another Dniestr? 
The Moldovan legislature is set to debate a proposal that would eliminate several 
small counties by dissolving them into larger units. One of those counties is 
Taraclia County, which would be dissolved into Cahul County. Sounds simple 
enough, except that Taraclia County is populated largely by Bulgars (exact 
numbers are questionable, but there is no question that Bulgars constitute a 
significant majority of the region). Last week, leaders of the Bulgar community 
threatened "unrest" if Taraclia is dissolved into Cahul, thus making them a 
minority. The Bulgarian Ambassador to Moldova was quoted as saying that 
"human rights" are not "an internal issue," and that if the legislature dissolves 
Taraclia, the Bulgars wish to be placed "under Transdniestr or Gagauzian 
jurisdiction." Legislative leaders responded by stating their intention to go ahead 
with plans to dissolve Taraclia County. (Evenimentul Zilei, 17 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-292, and Basapress, 1700 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-293) Maybe 
Russia can help. It seems to have the available manpower. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Azeri opposition parties resist election results 
According to the Azerbaijani Central Electoral Commission, incumbent President 
Heider Aliev won the 11 October election in the first round with over 75 percent of 
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the vote. His opponents, Etibar Mammadov and Nizami Suleimanov, received 
11.6 and 8.06 percent , respectively. (ITAR-TASS, 1136 GMT, 15 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-288) The OSCE's election monitors reported many instances of fraud 
and concluded that the "overall legal and administrative framework governing the 
election process fell short of meeting the international standards for a genuine 
election campaign." (Amnesty International, Update Letter No. 21 (1998), 30 Oct 
98) 
 
However, the difficulties in estimating the magnitude of the fraud prohibit a 
definitive statement as to whether those measures affected the election's 
outcome. In fact, the whole episode is reminiscent of Armenia's 1996 and 1998 
presidential elections. On those occasions international observers similarly 
scolded then-President Levon Ter-Petrosian and President Robert Kocharian. In 
1996, tanks were brought into the capital to quell opposition protests. One hopes 
that it will not come to that in Azerbaijan. Yet the opposition, bolstered by the 
international disapproval of Aliev, has been promoting ever-more radical ideas. 
 
The opposition parties which boycotted the election and the leading contender, 
Etibar Mammadov, refuse to recognize the results of the balloting. They claim 
that Aliev failed to garner the 67 percent necessary to avoid a runoff between the 
top two contenders. Mammedov's CEC representative, Fuad Agaev, stated that if 
there had been no vote falsification, Aliev would have received 61percent. 
(Amnesty International, Update Letter No. 20 (1998), 16 Oct 98) This is less than 
Azerbaijan's threshold but, in a field of six candidates, it certainly represents an 
impressive showing that would have secured the presidency legally in any 
number of other democratic systems. 
 
On 16 October, Mammadov announced plans to form a movement with the 
participation of the parties of the Movement for Democratic Elections and 
Electoral Reform (MDEER) -- the five that boycotted. The movement will work to 
unseat Aliev, but only through legal means. (Turan, 1400 GMT, 16 Oct 98; FBIS-
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SOV-98-289) A few days later the MDEER made public a letter to international 
organizations and foreign heads of state announcing that they regard Aliev's 
presidency as illegitimate and will not honor any treaty or agreement he may 
conclude. They called on international parties to boycott the Azerbaijani 
government. On the eve of the decision on the oil pipeline route, this is certainly 
a very provocative action. (Azadlyg, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295) 
 
In his letter of congratulations to Aliev, President Clinton reportedly mentioned 
the need to reform the membership of the CEC and repeated other major 
opposition demands. This action was characterized in Azerbaijan as a slap in the 
face of Aliev. Azeris are also linking the Congressional failure to lift the restriction 
imposed by Article 907 and the European Parliament's decision not to disburse a 
$50 million loan to the negative appraisal of the elections. (Azadlyg, 23 Oct 98, p. 
4; FBIS-SOV-98-299) Actually the Congressional decision to maintain 907 
preceded the election and certain new exemptions were added to ease the 
operation of the US Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corp. so that they may participate in financing the oil pipeline. (Journal of 
Commerce, 23 Oct 98; nexis) 
 
Tick, tock, tick, tock... 
The discussion of the route of the "main" oil pipeline has moved into its final 
phase. The consortium was supposed to announce its decision on the route on 
29 October but has postponed the announcement until sometime in November. 
Rumors about the abandonment of the Ceyhan project were rampant in the US 
and Azerbaijani media. The New York Times reported on 10 October that the oil 
companies refused to build the Ceyhan route, which is favored by the 
administration and by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. According to that article, 
the decision had already been made and last-minute diplomatic efforts 
concerned the manner in which it would be presented. The companies 
abandoned the Ceyhan option because Turkey and the US failed to supply 
enough financial inducements to justify the very expensive route. The AIOC, the 
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consortium charged with making the decision, has announced only that the 
construction of the Baku-Supsa line will continue and is due for completion in 
April. The Azerbaijani portion of that line has already been built. Apparently the 
companies hope to export the oil by tanker from Supsa, either through the 
Turkish straits or to Ukraine. (Strangely, there has been hardly any discussion of 
the Ukrainian route proposal.) 
 
The states involved are not treating the matter as settled. Turkey has made its 
position clear by warning that it will impose new limits on tanker traffic through 
the straits in the coming year for fear of an oil spill in its major city, Istanbul. 
(International Herald Tribune, 26 Oct 98; nexis) On 29 October President 
Suleiman Demirel and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz of Turkey; Heidar Aliev, 
president of Azerbaijan; Eduard Shevardnadze, president of Georgia; Nursultan 
Nazarbaev, president of Kazakhstan; Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan; 
and Bill Richardson, the US energy secretary signed, the Ankara Declaration 
which strongly supports the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan line. Clearly the 
governments still hope to pressure the companies into adopting that route. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
President Yel'tsin's visit considered brief, but successful by both sides 
According to spokesmen for both governments, Presidents Nazarbaev and 
Yel'tsin managed to cover all of the important items on their agenda, despite the 
fact that the Russian president was forced to cut short his 12 October visit to 
Kazakhstan. The two heads of state endorsed four agreements themselves, in 
addition to presiding over a signing ceremony for a number of other accords. The 
issue of Russian payment arrears for the lease of military testing sites and for the 
Baikonur Cosmodrome came one step closer to being resolved; the two sides 
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were finally able to agree on the terms of payment for the present year. The 
Russian government will pay half of the current year's rent ($27.5 million and 
$115 million for the military testing sites and for the cosmodrome, respectively) in 
cash, and the rest in spare parts and various types of military and civilian 
equipment. Presidents Yel'tsin and Nazarbaev also signed two treaties on 
economic cooperation for 1998-2000, which eliminate dual taxation on imports 
and exports between their countries, as well as a "protocol of intent" on the 
demarcation of the Kazakh-Russian border. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 Oct 98, p. 
1; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Some of the other agreements signed by representatives of both governments 
include accords on cooperation in the elimination of various types of cross-border 
criminal activity, such as money laundering and the drug trade; on the rights of 
both Kazakh and Russian citizens who work and/or reside at the Baikonur 
cosmodrome; and on cooperation in the design of an international thermonuclear 
experimental reactor. (Interfax, 1409 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-285) 
 
Assassination attempt or publicity stunt? 
Kazakhstan's former prime minister, Aqezhan Kazhegeldyn, reported an attempt 
on his life on 13 October. Kazhegeldyn said that two rifle shots were fired at him 
on the outskirts of Almaty, as he returned from an outing that evening. Both shots 
missed their mark, leading the former premier to believe that the marksmen's 
intent was only to intimidate him. (ITAR-TASS, 1340 GMT, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-287) Two weeks prior to the attempted shooting, Mr. Kazhegeldyn's 
bodyguards were prohibited from carrying firearms. (Interfax, 1238 GMT, 14 Oct 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) The former prime minister's supporters further stated that 
the day before the shooting took place, President Nazarbaev sent a message to 
Mr. Kazhegeldyn, requesting that he withdraw from the presidential elections. Mr. 
Kazhegeldyn, however, reaffirmed his candidacy for the post of president in the 
upcoming elections. (Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvy, 0716 GMT, 14 
Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 31 
 
Presidential spokesman Kairat Sarybaev, speaking to the press on 14 October, 
dismissed the attempted shooting as a publicity stunt, saying that according to 
evidence discovered by the National Security Committee, the rifle shots had 
merely been fired in the air. Mr. Sarybaev added that: "The methods used by 
certain politicians for boosting their popularity rating do not seem to have 
changed." (Interfax, 0944 GMT, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
On 14 October, Mr. Kazhegeldyn, Petr Svoik (chairman of the Azamat opposition 
movement), and Irina Savostina, (leader of another political opposition movement 
called Generation) were all taken into custody by the security services and 
charged with violating Kazakhstan's law on public gatherings, by organizing and 
participating in an illegal demonstration on 3 October. The demonstration was an 
effort by the opposition to protest the holding of early elections in January 1999, 
and to call for the election process to be free and fair. (ITAR-TASS, 1340 GMT, 
14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Comment 
Whether the assassination attempt on former prime minister Kazhegeldyn was 
genuine or staged, the harassment that he and other members of the opposition 
have been subjected to by the country's security services is very real indeed. 
Although President Nazarbaev purports to welcome competitors for his office, 
and has invited international observers to be present during the election itself in 
order to verify its fairness and validity, his administration's recent actions against 
leaders of the opposition speak much louder than his words. The charges that 
have been filed against Aqezhan Kazhegeldyn, Petr Svoik, Irina Savostina, and 
others may bar them from taking part in the presidential elections, since Kazakh 
law does not permit anyone with a criminal conviction to run for political office. 
 
'Caucasus corridor' to provide route for Kazakh exports 
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Kazakh Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimbaev recently led a government delegation 
to Tbilisi in order to discuss ways of broadening trade relations and economic 
cooperation. Topping the agenda was the issue of Kazakh oil exports. The 
Kazakh government has been searching for viable ways of transporting its oil 
reserves to the international market. New pipelines are being constructed across 
Kazakh territory to China and Iran, but until these routes are completed, Georgia 
will provide a transport corridor for Kazakh exports. According to an agreement 
concluded in 1996, two million tons of Kazakh oil will be shipped across Georgian 
territory this year (Interfax, 0822 GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295), and Prime 
Minister Balgimbaev was able to finalize an accord with Georgian officials on 22 
October which will allow Kazakhstan to increase its oil exports to ten million tons 
annually. The Georgian government will also permit the yearly transport of 12-15 
million tons of Kazakh non-oil products (e.g., metals and grain) across its 
territory. (Interfax, 1840 GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-296) The Kazakh prime 
minister also expressed an interest in obtaining part ownership of Georgia's Poti 
terminal (located on the Black Sea), in order to facilitate the shipment of Kazakh 
grain and metal exports. Kazakhstan currently exports 45,000 tons of grain to 
Georgia, and hopes to increase this quantity in the near future. (Interfax, 0822 
GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295) 
 
Comment 
At present, there is only one pipeline available for Kazakh oil exports. 
Unfortunately, this pipeline crosses Russian territory and its use for Kazakh oil 
shipments has caused a great deal of disagreement between the Russian and 
Kazakh governments. The Kazakh government has offered to pay transit fees for 
the oil which it transports through this pipeline, but the Russian administration 
insists on buying the oil at a price lower than what Kazakhstan is willing to 
accept. The two sides are at an impasse, and until the matter is resolved, 
Kazakhstan is barred from using the Russian pipeline. Consequently, the oil 
transit agreement with Georgia could provide the Kazakh government with a 
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much-needed opportunity to export at least a small portion of its petroleum 
reserves. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
President Akaev's reforms passed by referendum 
96 percent of Kyrgyzstan's eligible voters turned out to cast their ballots in the 17 
October referendum on the constitutional amendments (on such issues as 
private property, electoral reform, reform of the freedom of speech laws) which 
had been proposed by President Akaev. The amendments were passed by an 
overwhelming 90 percent majority. The voting was monitored by 30 international 
observers, as well as by members of the OSCE, and no irregularities were 
reported in the balloting procedure. President Akaev's first action following the 
successful passage of his constitutional reforms is expected to be the 
announcement of a decree on land transactions. He plans to proclaim a five-year 
moratorium on the buying and selling of land, and to prohibit non-residents from 
purchasing land in Kyrgyzstan. (ITAR-TASS, 0647 GMT, 18 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-291) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
Spies seen everywhere 
Russia's financial and political woes apparently have not kept the intelligence 
services preoccupied, as claims of spies abound. A small spy scandal of the 
bizarre sort cropped up in the Pskov region of Russia, adjacent to Estonia, 
involving an Estonian citizen--and self-described former KGB officer--named Ville 
Sonn. The public relations service of the Russian Federal Security Service 
reported that Sonn had been detained on the territory of a military facility in 
Pskov when he was engaged in visual reconnaissance. However, the public 
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relations center reported that the "Russian side, taking into account insignificant 
damage... and by the wish to maintain good-neighborly relations with Estonia, 
has made the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against him ...." 
Estonian government representatives downplayed the seriousness of the charge, 
citing Russia's low-key reaction and Sonn's personal history. Jana Vanamolder, 
press secretary for the Estonian embassy in Moscow, termed Sonn an 
"eccentric" whose unusual behavior had been reported on by the media on 
several occasions. (Interfax, 1048 GMT, 22 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-295) "Even the 
Estonian intelligence is no longer so green as to send a mentally imbalanced 
person to Russian military bases," Estonian secret services coordinator Eerik 
Niiles-Kross told journalists. (BNS, 1322 GMT, 24 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-297) 
Meanwhile, the Russian state news agency RIA-novosti reported that the alleged 
spy has a phenomenal memory, and that reports of mental disturbances are 
groundless. (BNS, 1322 GMT, 24 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-297) 
 
Sonn offered his own little twist: His videotaped confession, aired by the Russian 
NTV and RTR television channels, was the result of careful staging, he said. "Up 
to seven takes were made of each scene, it was quite a show," Sonn explained. 
"We rehearsed like in some theater or movie." According to a spokesperson from 
the Estonian foreign ministry, Estonia is not rushing to reply to Russia's request 
for a verbal explanation. Such an explanation will be sent within a "diplomatically 
polite period of time," news accounts reported. (BNS, 0948 GMT, 28 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-301) 
 
Former KGB officers apparently do not represent the only threat to Russia's 
security, however. According to Russia's ethnic affairs minister, Ramazan 
Abdulatipov, persons of Finno-Ugric background in Russia may be swayed by 
Finnish, Hungarian and Estonian persons delivering humanitarian aid and 
convinced of anti-Russian sentiments. (See Russian Federation Foreign 
Relations heading above for more details.) Careful watch should be placed on 
persons receiving such aid, he said, as well as those who are offered the 
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opportunity to study at higher education institutions in other countries. (BNS, 
1510 GMT, 23 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-296) Citizens in Latvia, Georgia, and 
Azerbaijan might enjoy the irony of Russia worrying about the possible 
exacerbation of ethnic minorities to create instability. 
 
LATVIA 
Apartment refurbishing leads to resignations 
Reports that National Armed Forces Commander Juris Eihmanis's service 
apartment was refurbished with over 40,000 lats from the Home Guard budget 
resulted in the commander's forced resignation last month. 
 
Eihmanis proved to be blind to the writing on the wall. While the in-house 
investigation was continuing, President Guntis Ulmanis promised to hold off on 
removing Eihmanis from his post, expressing the conviction that the commander 
would step down if the investigation demonstrated his guilt. (Baltic News Service 
Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 14 Oct 98). In spite of the faith Ulmanis showed in the 
commander's political savvy, Eihmanis later told journalists he would not resign, 
but would leave his post only if ordered to do so by the president. He denied the 
allegations against him, and said he found out that the 42,000 lats had been 
used for the refurbishing only after returning from a trip to the United States, 
when the work was nearly finished. (Radio Riga Network, 1500 GMT, 22 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-295) At the end of the investigation, and with the support of 
Minister of Defense Talavs Jundzis as well as the chief prosecutor of the military 
prosecutor's office, the president did demand Eihmanis' resignation. (Radio Riga 
Network, 1400 and 1500 GMT, 26 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-299) Alas, support of 
the president's decision was not enough to keep Jundzis's position; the next day 
Prime Minister Guntars Krasts demanded his resignation. (Radio Riga Network, 
1200 GMT, 27 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-300) 
 
Russian officers complain of Russian treatment 
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While the head of Latvia's military faced career woes because of his housing, 
members of the Russian military must deal with the obverse: housing woes 
because of their careers. Several Russian officers based at the Skrunda radar 
station have complained to the Latvian National Human Rights Office about 
unsatisfactory living conditions that they face if they return to Russia. Under an 
international agreement, Latvia compensated Russia for military apartments the 
officers are leaving behind in Latvia. That compensation in turn was meant to be 
used to purchase apartments in Russia. However, the officers report that, in 
some cases, no apartments were acquired, while in other cases the housing is in 
very poor condition. (BNS, 0928 GMT, 20 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-293) 
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